Plate text
Software reads plates from passing traffic and stores the result in a searchable system.
ALPR stands for automated license plate reader. I use ALPR to describe the whole system: cameras, plate-reading software, stored scan records, and the platform agencies use to search and share those records. A scan stores the plate reading, image, time, location, and details such as make, model, color, and visible features. Flock turns routine travel into searchable records that law enforcement users search later.
I cite the 2026 analysis of software recovered from a Flock camera: it tracked people’s movements as well as vehicles and stored dozens of images from a single encounter. These cameras build a record of people and the places they go. Read the 404 Media and WIRED investigation ↗
Time and place
Every scan is tied to a camera location and timestamp. Repeated scans map routines and routes.
Vehicle details
Images and descriptors such as make, model, color, and visible features add detail to each record.
UTD’s searches reach California.
Flock uploads scan records to a shared platform. Participating law-enforcement agencies search across cameras and jurisdictions. A search that starts with UTD data reaches far beyond campus.
I asked UTD PD where its data goes. The Retrograde’s August 2026 report on UTD PD’s transparency page listed 528 organizations with access, including West Des Moines PD in Iowa and Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Office in California. At a Senate meeting, UTD PD told me it shares Flock information with 593 outside law-enforcement agencies. UTD cannot control or enforce those agencies’ data policies and has never directly audited them for misuse of student data. Those agencies can pass the information onward. UTD’s system reaches from North Texas to California and across the country.
UTD PD also said it will cooperate with ICE when required by law, including under Texas SB 4 and federal 287(g) agreements. I also read The Retrograde’s review of 24 UTD PD searches: only 10 listed a reason, and one logged reason said an officer wanted to check when an ex-boyfriend left campus. UTD’s search form did not require a reason, and Flock did not check the entries. That is a breakdown in oversight.
I reject a searchable record of everyday life.
I oppose mass collection of movement data. Searches expose visits to clinics, religious services, protests, labor meetings, political events, and student organizations. I demand that entering campus, organizing, reporting, and gathering never create a police-search record.
I reject Flock and every replacement ALPR vendor. A different brand preserves the same surveillance system. My resolution demands removal, public oversight, shared governance, and safety measures that do not rely on mass tracking.
I am demanding removal of UTD’s 13 cameras.
UTD PD told me its cameras record around 30,000 plate scans each weekday, reported 66 alerts for 2026, and cost $32,500 a year. UTD’s transparency page lists 86,373 unique cars in a month. Those figures come from my conversation with UTD PD and its transparency page. They expose the scale and cost of the system UTD runs across campus.
UTD PD told me it has no control over what happens after its data reaches 593 off-campus police departments, including agencies as far away as Santa Barbara County, California. It has never directly audited those agencies for misuse of student data. This is a nationwide surveillance network, connected to every campus entrance covered by Flock.
I brought Student Government Resolution 2026-09 to demand that UTD remove every Flock camera, reject replacement ALPR systems, and require public review and community testimony. Read the full resolution ↗
My position: Remove UTD’s Flock cameras. Reject replacement ALPRs. Stop building searchable records of campus life.