In Opposition to Flock Automated License Plate Reader Cameras and Automated License Plate Reader Surveillance at UT Dallas

Reaffirming the purpose of the Student Government of The University of Texas at Dallas as a representative body charged with advocating for the interests, rights, welfare, and civil liberties of the student body; and

Considering that institutions of higher education have a unique responsibility to foster academic freedom, free expression, civic engagement, student journalism, and the free exchange of ideas without unnecessary monitoring or surveillance; and

Whereas the University of Texas at Dallas Police Department currently operates thirteen Flock Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) cameras at roadway entrances and exits throughout campus¹; and

Whereas these cameras collect information on vehicles entering and exiting campus, including license plate numbers, vehicle make, model, color, location, time, and other distinguishing characteristics^{2 3}; and

Recognizing that Automated License Plate Reader systems collect and store information on all passing vehicles regardless of whether the driver or occupants are suspected of criminal activity ^{1 4}; and

Recognizing that reporting by The Retrograde and The Mercury documented that approximately 52,594 unique vehicles were scanned by the Flock system within a thirty-day period and that data collected through the system is accessible through a network of hundreds of external law enforcement agencies^{1 5}; and

Whereas publicly available information indicates that data collected through the Flock system may be made accessible to more than 500 external law enforcement agencies throughout the United States^{2 1}; and

Acknowledging that investigative reporting by 404 Media and WIRED documented that hackers were able to physically obtain a Flock camera, copy substantial portions of data stored on the device, recover an encryption key stored on the camera itself, and access logs and imagery generated by the device, raising concerns regarding the security of data collected through Flock systems⁶; and

Recognizing that analysis of the recovered camera software found that Flock cameras explicitly detect people in addition to vehicles, license plates, bicycles, and other objects, and may generate dozens of images from a single vehicle encounter resulting in the creation of extensive surveillance records⁶; and

Considering that the recovered data demonstrated how a single camera generated approximately 1.6 million images and photographed more than 50,000 vehicles over several weeks of operation, illustrating the scale of information collected by these systems⁶; and

Whereas students, faculty, staff, and visitors are subjected to this surveillance merely by traveling to, from, or through campus regardless of whether they are connected to any criminal investigation^{3 4}; and

Recognizing that universities have historically served as centers for student activism, political organizing, labor advocacy, journalism, academic inquiry, and civic participation, all of which rely upon the ability of members of the university community to participate without fear of surveillance or monitoring^{2 7 4}; and

Considering that university campuses serve as centers of journalism, student organizing, protest, advocacy, community engagement, and academic inquiry, making the protection of expressive activity particularly important within higher education institutions; and

Recognizing that surveillance technologies capable of recording and storing movement data may discourage participation in demonstrations, political events, student organizations, advocacy campaigns, labor actions, and other forms of activity protected by the First Amendment and principles of academic freedom ^{7 8}; and

Whereas investigations conducted by the Electronic Frontier Foundation found that more than fifty federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies used Flock's nationwide surveillance network to conduct searches relating to protests, political demonstrations, and activist organizations^{8 9}; and

Whereas those investigations documented searches associated with the "50501," "Hands Off," and "No Kings" protest movements as well as searches targeting activist organizations, demonstrating that ALPR databases have been used to monitor lawful political activity and protected expression^{8 9}; and

Acknowledging that investigations by the Electronic Frontier Foundation documented instances in which ALPR systems were used in abortion-related investigations, immigration-related investigations, and surveillance of activists and vulnerable populations^{9 8}; and

Acknowledging that local and national reporting have documented instances in which law enforcement personnel allegedly used ALPR systems to monitor current or former romantic partners and conduct searches unrelated to legitimate criminal investigations⁴; and

Recognizing that investigations conducted by the Electronic Frontier Foundation found numerous instances in which officers accessed ALPR databases while documenting nonsensical or unserious justifications including “LOL,” “LMAO,” “idk,” “blah,” “weird kid,” and other similarly inappropriate entries in audit records intended to justify surveillance searches¹⁰; and

Acknowledging that these investigations documented searches reaching thousands of camera networks and tens of thousands of cameras despite the absence of meaningful explanations for why the searches were conducted¹⁰; and

Considering that such findings raise concerns regarding the effectiveness of existing auditing systems, internal oversight procedures, and self-policing mechanisms used to regulate access to ALPR databases^{10 11 1}; and

Recognizing that the Electronic Frontier Foundation's policy position is that the primary concern with ALPR systems is not simply misuse by individual actors or agencies, but rather the existence of a system designed to continuously collect, retain, and permit retrospective searches of location information from large numbers of people regardless of suspicion⁴; and

Considering that Flock Safety itself has acknowledged concerns regarding retention periods, search restrictions, misuse prevention, and accountability mechanisms through reforms announced in response to growing public criticism of ALPR surveillance¹¹; and

Recognizing that recent actions by the State of Texas, the State of Florida, and numerous local governments have demonstrated growing bipartisan concern regarding ALPR surveillance technologies and their impact on privacy, civil liberties, and public trust¹²; and

Whereas multiple cities and local governments throughout the United States have cancelled, paused, suspended, or declined Flock contracts following public concerns regarding surveillance, privacy, mission creep, and misuse of collected data^{12 9}; and

Whereas reporting by The Retrograde documented concerns from members of the university community regarding the potential impact of Flock cameras on privacy, free expression, student organizing, and public trust in university administration and law enforcement ^{2 7}; and

Whereas investigative reporting by The Dallas Morning News and the Investigative Reporting Program at UC Berkeley found that colleges across the United States used social media surveillance platforms originally marketed as campus-safety tools to monitor student protests, demonstrations, activist organizations, and other forms of protected expression, and further documented that UT Dallas was among the universities provided with a Social Sentinel whitepaper entitled “Demonstrations and Protests: Using Social Media to Gather Intelligence and Respond to Campus Crowds,” which described how such technology could be used to gather intelligence before and during demonstrations, raising concerns regarding the potential for mission creep when surveillance technologies are deployed on university campuses¹³; and

Recognizing that universities have historically adopted surveillance technologies for limited public-safety purposes only to later expand their use toward monitoring protest activity, political organizing, and student dissent, demonstrating that the risk posed by surveillance systems is not limited to their stated purpose at the time of adoption but also includes future uses enabled by the existence of a retained surveillance infrastructure;¹³ and

Whereas the installation of Flock cameras at UT Dallas occurred without substantial consultation with Student Government, faculty governance bodies, or the broader university community despite the significant privacy implications of the technology^{7 2}; and

Recognizing that meaningful shared governance requires transparency, accountability, and stakeholder participation whenever the University adopts technologies that substantially affect student rights, privacy, and daily life; and

Whereas the Police Oversight Committee exists to improve accountability, transparency, and trust between the university community and the University of Texas at Dallas Police Department¹; and

Recognizing that public confidence in campus safety initiatives depends upon transparency, accountability, meaningful public participation, and respect for civil liberties; therefore,